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A SURVEY OF THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS
ALAIN SHEER*
Nations customarily engage in international trade and just as regularly adopt
policies which regulate that trade to meet national objectives. These policies typi-
cally involve import (or export) tariffs or their equivalents. Economic integration
refers to the process by which nations reduce such trade barriers and reorganize
multiple economies to meet national and supranational objectives. The levels of
economic integration are usually identified as (1) the free trade area; (2) the cus-
toms union; (3) the common market; (4) the economic union; and (5) total eco-
nomic integration. The free trade area involves the abolition of tariffs and
equivalent trade restrictions between members of the area, with each member se-
lecting its own trade policy for nonmembers. The customs union is a free trade
area with a common trade policy with respect to nonmembers. The common mar-
ket has all the elements of the customs union, and additionally, permits factors to
move freely among member nations. An economic union is a common market in
which members coordinate national economic policies. Finally, total economic in-
tegration is an economic union for which a supranational agency determines mon-
etary, fiscal, trade, and social policies for all member nations.
Each integration level involves some elements of freer trade and some of addi-
tional protection for producers, "since the protected market available to these pro-
ducers is enlarged by the creation of a protected position in the markets of other
countries partner to the union in addition to their protected position in their do-
mestic market."' The "theory of customs unions [is] . . . [a special] branch of
tariff theory that deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory changes in
trade restrictions ' 2 . A useful starting point in discussing customs unions is a sur-
vey of the fundamentals of international trade theory and of the costs, benefits,
and motives for protection by tariff strategy.
I
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE
Casual observation demonstrates that consumption decisions by any economic
actor result in a diversified consumption bundle and that production may be spe-
cialized (ze., fewer goods are produced than comprise the consumption bundle) or
generalized. The advantage of production specialization, whether for an individ-
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2. Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unons: A General Survey, 70 ECON. J. 496, 496 (1960).
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ual, a region, a nation, or a group of nations, and the process by which such advan-
tage can be realized have been understood since the days of Adam Smith.3
Production specialization creates the potential for an enlarged consumption bun-
dle relative to that consistent with generalized production. This potential can be
realized only through trade. Specialization in the production of those goods which
can be produced relatively efficiently and trading these goods for goods which can
only be produced relatively inefficiently reduces the real costs of most, if not all,
goods comprising the consumption bundle.4 As a result, specialization and trade
permit consumption in excess of production capabilities.
It follows that the magnitude of realized gains from trade depends on the terms
of trade5 at which trade occurs.6 The boundaries of the potential range of the
terms of trade are the relative prices of these products in each economy in autar-
chy. This must be so if each trading economy is to gain-or at worst, not lose-
from trade. 7 The actual terms of trade are determined by market forces at the
level where the quantity demanded by all traders equals the quantity supplied by
all traders. 8 The result is that free trade between nations depends on the existence
of comparative advantages, 9 and yields real income increases for at least one trad-
ing partner without reducing the real income of other traders and of the world as a
whole.' 0 There is, simply, a more efficient allocation of the world's productive
resources.
This analysis makes clear the necessary preconditions for mutually beneficial
trade, as well as the central role of the terms of trade in the allocation of trade
gains between trading partners. It follows that any nation which can implement
policies affecting the actual terms of trade can alter the magnitude and distribu-
3. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, chs. 1, 2 (1937).
4. This principle, by which the identity of goods to be produced is determined, is termed comparative
advantage. The source of the cost or price advantage is unspecified here. In addition to this source of gain
from trade, gains may also result from learning by doing (a division of labor and other productive factors)
and from economies of scale realized from a larger market. All this presumes that more consumption goods
are preferred to fewer consumption goods so that an enlarged consumption bundle adds to consumer wel-
fare. Finally, transportation costs and other impediments are assumed away.
5. "Terms of trade" is defined as the index of the prices of exported products relative to the index of
the prices of imported products. Indices are required whenever there are more than one export product
and more than one import product.
6. A fuller development of the real income effect is given in note 14 ilfra.
7. The gain is in the sense of enlarged consumption or real income. The market forces are represented
by the balance of trade. Further explanation is provided in note 13 bnfra.
8. This result involves no assumption about the presence or absence of monopoly or monopsony
power.
9. Note that the existence of a comparative advantage implies the existence of a comparative disad-
vantage so that no single economy can be the most efficient supplier of all products.
10. This discussion does not consider the income redistribution within an economy resulting from
trade. The conclusion is merely that the economy as a whole benefits and not that each agent in that
economy benefits. Ergo, free trade may be resisted by some segments in an economy. Nevertheless, in
principle, it should be possible for the gainers in an economy to compensate the losers in that economy so
that free trade benefits all agents in that economy. A caveat which must be recognized is that the appro-
priateness of any policy depends on the prevailing income distribution. Hence, any policy which changes
the income distribution may, in fact, be sounding its own death knell. The usual analysis presumes that
the policy produces a relatively small change in the distribution of income so that this difficulty is avoided.
For a discussion of the impact of law upon income distribution and Pareto optimality, see Mishan, Pareto
Opttnalty and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 255 (1967).
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tion of any international gains from trade. Plainly, this question of political econ-
omy (or the exercise of international monopoly or monopsony power) reflects
varied interests, including a national desire to increase the gains from trade above
the free trade level, and a desire by those losing from a free trade policy to protect
themselves from such losses." The achievement of these objectives is commonly
attempted by dumping, cartel, and tariff strategies.' 2
II
TARIFF THEORY AND THE MOTIVES FOR PROTECTION
A. Tariffs, the Terms of Trade and Real Income' 3
The tactic usually adopted to exploit price-setting capability is the import good
(hereafter import) tariff. The tariff drives a wedge between the relative price of
export goods (hereafter exports) on the world market (the terms of trade) and the
domestic market. Normally, the imposition of an import tariff improves the terms
of trade' 4 available to the imposing nation.' 5 Furthermore, the import tariff
11. Generally, these losers produce goods which can be more efficiently produced or sold by foreign-
ers. Compensation for their losses could eliminate the pressure to exercise monopoly/monopsony power.
12. Tariffs are ad valorem taxes (or subsidies) on imported or exported goods. The Lerner symmetry
theorem identifies the economic equivalence of tariffs on imported goods and exported goods. See A. Sheer,
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Transfers and Exchange Rate Destabilization, at 39-48 (Aug., 1976) (unpub-
lished dissertation in Duke University Library). This consideration of tariffs does not evaluate retaliation
effects. For an oveirview of this problem, see Tower, Sheer & Baas, Alternative Optimum TariffStructures as
Devices for Transferring Real Income, 45 S. ECON. J. 18 (1978).
13. This discussion does not consider the question of effective protection because the absence of input
tariffs has been implicitly assumed. This concept refers to the actual protection afforded by input and
output tariff imposition. Simply put, the effect of an input good (or immediate good) tariff is equivalent to
a tax on production. This effect works against the effect of an output good tariff, so that domestic import
and import-competing production may actually fall relative to the free trade level where input and output
tariffs exist simultaneously. As a result, effective protection is a more useful measure of the implications of
the tariff structure. See Grubel, A Non-Speciazsl Guide to the Theoy of Eaective Protection in EFFECTIVE TARIFF
PROTECTION 1-4 (H. Grubel and H. Johnson eds. 1971).
14. As is well known, the effect of small changes in the import tariff rate on the terms of trade is
described by the equation -(n' + or)/(E+e*-l) when tariffs revenues are returned to consumers or are
spent by government in a resource neutral fashion. n', o, e and E* represent the imposing nation's compen-
sated price elasticity of demand for imports, that nation's price elasticity of supply of imports or import
competing goods, that nation's offer curve elasticity (m n + or) and the foreign nation's offer curve elasticity
(- n* + or*), respectively. The F's suggest that any price change has three effects: (1) a substitution effect
on consumption, (2) an income effect on consumption (where (1) and (2) are given as n, n*), and (3) a
supply effect a. n' and a are positive, as is (e+e* -1) when the system is stable (ile., an increase in the
import tariff rate reduces (increases) a balance of trade deficit (surplus). Therefore, import tariff imposi-
tion should improve (reduce) the imposing nation's terms of trade. However, as Metzler pointed out, this
need not be true. See Metzler, "Tariffs, The Terms of Trade, and the Distribution of National Income", 57
J. POL. ECON. 58 (Feb. 1949).
15. Elasticity measures the relative responsiveness of the quantity demanded (or supplied) to changes
in the relative price of the good in question. The price elasticity of demand is another way of expressing
the universally adopted result that the quantity demanded varies inversely with product price. The price
elasticity of demand may be decomposed into two components: (1) a price substitution term, n'; and (2) an
income term, m. The income term simply suggests that a price decline, for example, allows a given money
income to purchase a larger quantity of goods and services and therefore is equivalent to some increase in
money income, holding prices constant at the original price level. This is plainly welfare-increasing and
tends to encourage consumption of all goods (except inferior goods). The substitution effect suggests that
consumers respond to the lower relative price by reallocating expenditures in favor of the good whose
relative price has fallen while holding the total satisfaction from all consumption constant. As a result, a
price decline (increase) creates one force which increases (reduces) the quantity demanded of the good
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usually increases the relative price of imports behind the tariff wall. 16 Conse-
quently, it is usual for the import tariff to raise the imposing nation's terms of trade
and increase the domestic relative price of imports.
These results have opposing effects on real income. Terms of trade improve-
ments are real income increasing because imports cost relatively less on the world
market, so that any money income purchases a larger number of consumption
good units. However, the increase in the domestic relative price of imports reduces
consumption and real income because the domestic relative price of imports ex-
ceeds the world price. 1 7 The final effect on real income is the sum of these forces.
This sum may be positive, negative or zero.' 8 Accordingly, import tariff strategies
may, depending on the rate selected, increase, decrease, or have no effect on real
income relative to the free trade level. It follows that selection of the tariff rate is
crucial to the objective of real income maximization.
The real income maximization (or optimal tariff) argument is but one motive
for discrimination. The economics literature provides other motives. These may
be generally classified under the headings (1) market failure correction, (2) social
welfare objectives, and (3) economic stability objectives. 19 Discussion of these ar-
guments requires further evaluation of the effects of the import tariff.
The effects of the import tariff within the tariff-imposing nation revolve around
the tariff-induced changes in relative prices and tariff revenue considerations.
20
The increase in the domestic relative price of imports encourages domestic produc-
tion of imports and import-competing products. The tariff protects these produ-
cers from more efficient foreign competition. This process tends to increase the
total revenue to producers and the payout to various productive factors. Domestic
consumers clearly pay more for import goods and consequently reduce their con-
sumption; they absorb the total cost of tariff revenues unless the nation has the
whose price changed, as well as another force which increases (reduces) the quantity demanded of that
good. The net effect of the price change upon the quantity demanded of that good, n, is the sum of the
income and substitution effects. A formal discussion of these considerations may be found in R. MUNDELL,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 15 (1968). It follows that every absolute price change creates a change in
relative prices and a real income effect. As a result, whenever the relative price of exports (the terms of
trade) increases (the relative price of imports falls), real income rises.
16. An increase requires that (*+m -1)/(E+E* -1) be positive or that E*+m > I when the system is
stable. m is the tariff-imposing nation's marginal propensity to import (the fraction of each extra income
unit devoted to imports).
17. Recall the standard gain from trade involved purchasing at the relatively low price, or selling at
the relatively high price, thereby providing a gain relative to the price in autarchy.
Formally, the effect on real income of small import tariff rate changes is given by the sign of the
equation -Mdp + tdM where dp is the change in the world relative price of imports due to the tariff rate
change (the inverse of the terms of trade effect), t is the tariff rate, M is the free trade volume of imports
and dM is the change in the free trade level volume of imports due to the tariff rate change, respectively.
Hence, -Mdp is the terms of trade effect and tdM is the volume effect.
18. The net effect is positive, negative or zero as the terms of trade effect exceeds, falls short of or
equals the volume effect. An example of the net negative result is the prohibitive tariff (which chokes off all
trade, producing the autarchy result).
19. This follows the organization adopted by Grubel in H. GRUBEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS,
chs. 7, 8 (1977).
20. The revenue considerations are considered in note 15 supra and in text accompanying notes 24, 25
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capability to set or affect market price.2' The forces generated by the import tariff
which bear on these explanations for tariff imposition can be geometrically identi-
fied in a partial equilibrium setting.
22
FIGURE 1
D
PRICE OF
IMNPORTS, P D, 7 SsN //
X7
N\ //
//
N K
(OP)(l +t)=Pt ---- S
P
0) B F Q, Q QU \NTITi OF
IMPORTS, Q
The partial equilibrium analysis usually involves the assumption that the for-
eign supply function is infinitely elastic (reflecting constant costs). This forces the
entire tariff burden onto domestic consumers of imports. In Figure 1, the domestic
demand and supply functions are given by the schedules D and S, respectively,
and reflect the usual experience that buyers take less as price rises while sellers offer
more under the same conditions. The foreign supply schedule, S*, is horizontal,
reflecting constant costs, and intersects the domestic supply schedule at point A (so
that domestic suppliers are more efficient at output levels below OB). Accord-
ingly, the effective supply schedule before tariff imposition is SAS*, with an equi-
librium result at point C (with a price of OP and a quantity supplied and
demanded of OQ). The level of domestic production is OB with imports of BQ.
The tariff falls upon domestic consumers and raises the price of imports to
(OP)(I+t) where t is the tariff rate. This lies above OP so that the effective foreign
21. The condition required to preclude monopoly/monopsony power is that r.* = 0 so that the tariff
has no effect on the terms of trade. This may occur because the foreign price elasticity of demand for the
imposing nation's export goods is infinitely elastic (selling more or less cannot affect price) or because the
foreign price elasticity of supply of the imposing nation's import good is infinitely elastic (buying more or
less cannot affect price). As a result, the tariff burden falls entirely on those consuming import goods in the
tariff-imposing nation. R. CAVES & R. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 186-87, 441-44 (2d ed.
1977).
22. Partial equilibrium means that a single market is the focus for analysis and assumes that changes
in price or output in this market have no effective repercussions in other markets. The assumption simpli-
fies the analysis of the effects of tariffs.
Page 33: Summer 19811
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
supply schedule becomes S*t. The effective supply schedule becomes SADS*t.
The market solution yields a price of OP, with domestic production of OF and
imports of FQ. Tariff revenues are collected in the amount of (Pt - P)
(FQt) = GDEH. The summary of effects of the tariff follows:
1. Production efect. Domestic output increases from OB to OF. This output in-
creases producer revenues by (OPt)(BF) = BJDF.
2. Subsidy efect. Domestic producers also receive increased sales revenues on units
that would have been produced in the absence of the tariff. This amounts to
(P, - P)(OB = PPtJA. The total effect of the tariff on sales revenues is
PPtJA + BJDF. However, the area under the supply schedule between any two
output levels measures the total variable cost of producing the output difference.
These total costs are payments to the productive factors (land, labor, capital, en-
trepreneurial skill) consumed in producing the output difference so that the tariff
increases production costs by the amount BADF. Hence, the net subsidy to produ-
cers is the increase in sales revenues less the increase in costs, or PADP t. This
represents a redistribution of income from consumers to producers.
3. Consumption effect. Consumption of the good falls in the amount QQ t . The
area under a demand schedule between two output levels represents what consum-
ers would have been willing to pay to consume that quantity of the product. Here
consumers who, prior to tariff imposition, would have been willing to pay QtECQ
for output QtQ actually paid out QtHCQ The difference, HEC, represents a loss
to consumers due to the reduced volume of consumption. 23
4. Consumption tax effect. The cost of import good consumption (regardless of the
supply source) increases in the amount (Pt - P)(OQt) = PHEPt.
5. Tarfrevenue eject. Tariff revenue collections from domestic consumers amount
to (Pt - P)(FQ,) = DEHG. This is a redistribution of income from consumers to
government. No welfare cost is attached to the transfer since, by assumption, gov-
ernment either redistributes the revenues to consumers or spends the revenues as
the private sector would.
6. Balance of payments effect. Import volume falls in the amount BF + QtQ (in-
creased domestic production plus reduced total consumption) so that the deficit
ledger of the trade account falls by (BF + QtQ)(OP) = BAGF + QtHCQ.
7. Welfare (real income) effect. The net effect is the sum of the gains to producers
and government and the losses to consumers. This is
(2) + (5) - (3) - (4) = ADG + HEC. HEC has already been described as a
deadweight loss due to reduced import volume. ADG represents a deadweight loss
in efficiency because the tariff induces a movement of factors from a more produc-
tive to a less productive use. It follows that, although the effect of the tariff on real
income is negative, the tariff induces factor movement into import and import-
competing production, increases production of these goods, provides government
with revenue, improves the payments balance, and redistributes income to produ-
cers and government. Consumers could bribe all the other economic agents (by
23. The measure of effect on consumers is usually termed consumer's surplus. The derivation of the
measure involves the restrictive assumption that the measurement good display a zero income elasticity of
demand.
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providing them with an amount equal to their tariff-induced gains) to prevent the
tariff imposition,2 4 and thereby avoid the net loss.2 5
B. Tariffs as a Correction for Market Failure
The argument that tariff imposition corrects market failures is based on the
notion that free trade sometimes fails to allocate resources efficiently so that some
government intervention may increase efficiency. Conventionally, market failure
arguments include the effects of externalities, the structure of the developing econ-
omy, and the infant industry case.
The infant industry argument has been frequently used to justify tariff imposi-
tion. It is based on the premise that a newly organized industry is relatively ineffi-
cient and that tariff protection permits it to become relatively efficient. 26 It is
commonly argued that the change in relative efficiency results from learning by
doing and from the realization of economies of scale. In the real world, three
major application problems may preclude these results: (1) it may be difficult to
identify an infant industry which could eventually acquire a comparative advan-
tage, (2) it may be very difficult to determine when and if the tariff should be
abolished because prices tend to be inflexible downward so that any cost reduc-
tions provide larger returns to productive factors and vested interests, and (3) the
case for protection requires a difficult comparison of discounted costs of protection
against benefits over typically different time dimensions. Also, a strong counter-
argument is presented by the Coase theorem, which suggests that social and busi-
ness organizations adjust to internalize externalities.2 7
An externality-induced market failure occurs whenever activities by consump-
tion or production agents affect third parties through mechanisms other than price
(e.g., alterations in technological or consumption opportunities). The externality
may have positive or negative effects. Common examples include pollution, ur-
banization, national defense capacity, and immiserizing growth. The Coase theo-
rem posits that the externality exists because some property right has not been
assigned; therefore, there is no incentive for the externality generator to consider it
in the decision calculus. Any assignment of the property right would force its in-
clusion in the decision calculus and preclude the market failure. 28 Nevertheless,
such a market solution may be precluded because negotiation costs are greater
than the value of the externality or because social organizations cannot or will not
assign certain property rights. Under these circumstances, positive externalities
may be encouraged by an increase (or negative externalities discouraged by a re-
24. This possibility is one explanation for the view that the tariff is an inefficient way to accomplish
these results.
25. This model contains no terms of trade effect, so the tariff-imposing nation cannot use the policy to
raise its real income.
26. The same argument has been applied to industries operating with inefficient and obsolete equip-
ment and techniques.
27. An explanation of this argument follows in the section on the externality market failure argument.
See Coase, The ftoblem of Soczal Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
28. The assignment forces, for example, the generator of a negative externality to include as a cost any
payment that those adversely affected might pay to prevent the activity.
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duction) in the relative price of the good in question. Tariffs are a device to ac-
complish this change in relative prices.
The developing economy structure argument arises from the observation that
some predominantly agricultural developing economies have very low average
product values for agricultural labor. This suggests that the marginal product for
labor is very low. These same economies have relatively weak industrial sectors
which, nevertheless, set wages for the agricultural sector. These wages are too high
to permit profit maximization in agriculture. Put differently, the agricultural sec-
tor has surplus labor.29 Accordingly, protection of the industrial sector would in-
duce greater output and draw labor from the agricultural sector into the industrial
sector. The average product of labor would rise, providing an improvement in
national welfare.
C. Tariffs to Attain Income Redistribution and Other Social Goals
Social welfare objectives typically include income redistribution, revenue gen-
eration, and industrialization. The income redistribution question was evaluated,
in part, in the partial equilibrium setting above. There, income was redistributed
from consumers to producers and to government. However, the partial equilib-
rium model is predicated upon no changes in other markets. Therefore, the factor
bills increased but the actual level of wages and rents remained the same. The
only effect was to increase the firm's profits. 30 Accordingly, an analysis of the ef-
fect of an import tariff on wages and rents requires a general equilibrium analy-
sis. 3 t The effect of terms of trade changes upon wages and rents has been
evaluated in the neoclassical trade model proposed by Hecksher and Ohlin. 3 2
III
THE SECOND BEST ARGUMENT AGAINST TARIFFS
The issue is the efficiency with which import tariff strategies can accomplish
economic and noneconomic objectives. In this sense the tariff is often second
best. 33 The general result is that the import tariff is a relatively efficient technique
to maximize real income in the presence of trade monopoly power and to reach
trade level objectives. This strategy is relatively inefficient in reaching other goals.
Recall Figure 1 and its assumptions, as well as the effect of the import tariff on
consumption, production, and income distribution. 34 Assume a national objective
29. This argument has not been empirically proven or disproven.
30. The perfectly competitive firm, in equilibrium, produces where profits are zero (every factor paid
at least as well as in the next best alternative). The area under the supply schedule covers variable costs;
the so-called producers' surplus covers fixed costs. The price increase due to the tariff enlarges the produ-
cers' surplus. However, fixed costs do not change. Consequently, there are extra revenues to be retained by
the firms or distributed to owners.
31. This analysis is general in the sense that no markets are assumed to be insulated from changes in
other markets. This permits evaluation of changes in the terms of trade.
32. See B. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933). See a/so Kreinin, North Ameri-
can E conomic Inlegraton, 44:3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (1981).
33. Second best has several meanings in economics. Here it is used to denote less efficient. Later it
will be used to identify an optimum solution when free trade cannot be obtained.
34. Recall also that this case assumes no terms of trade effect.
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of domestic production of imports and import-competing goods of amount OF.35
This production target comes at a national cost of ADG + HEC. The consump-
tion loss, HEC, could have been avoided.36  The same output target could have
been reached by a free trade policy (implying a price of OP and consumption in
amount OQ) and a subsidy of DG per unit of output. The subsidy has the effect of
shifting the domestic supply schedule downward to Ss while producing the free
trade consumption solution. As a result, consumers avoid the consumption tax
and consumption effect and benefit by PCEP. Government loses revenue in
amount DEHG, and there is a subsidy cost of (DG)(OF) = PGDPt. The net sav-
ings in attaining the production constraint by subsidy rather than by import tariff
is HEC. Plainly, the import tariff strategy is second best because the subsidy does
not change the price and, therefore, does not create a consumption distortion.3 7
This same analysis can be applied to evaluate noneconomic consumption
targets. Using Figure 1 and its associated assumptions, assume a consumption tar-
get of OQt units of the import. The import tariff achieves this result at a cost of
ADG + HEC plus resource reallocation costs. A direct consumption tax on im-
ports would shift the demand schedule to D. This produces the desired consump-
tion effect without creating a production distortion, and reduces the cost of the
policy to HEC. Once again, the tariff is second best to a more direct policy.3 8
Finally, an intention to redistribute incomes to rectify some noneconomic fac-
tor payment differentials can be best accomplished by a factor tax or subsidy. The
tariff strategy falls into the second best range. 39 Moreover, these policy prescrip-
tions are equally applicable to the cases of distortions originating in the market.
Distortions originating in the market have the same effect as noneconomic distor-
tions in that they prevent the satisfaction of Pareto optimality conditions.40 For
example, a noneconomic production target below the level where price equals
marginal cost (the efficient production optimality condition) or simply where
demand equals supply in competitive markets forces price to exceed marginal cost.
35. Bhagwati calls such constraints noneconomic. See Bhagwati, The Generalized Theogy of DzJtorltns and
We/fare, in TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH 87 (1971).
36. A target of reduced production could be efficiently obtained by a production tax.
37. This conclusion may not be appropriate for a nation which can affect the terms of trade by its
tariff policy. Such an economy may minimize the cost of such noneconomic constraints by imposing a
combination tariff and tax/subsidy policy. More specifically, such an economy should impose the opti-
mum tariff and then use a tax/subsidy to discourage/encourage production to reach a target level different
from that induced by the optimum tariff. The common sense of this is that the optimum tariff maximizes
real income and raises it to a level above that reached in free trade, so that any further price adjustment by
tariff rate changes may allow satisfaction of the production target but injures consumers. Hence, the con-
sumption distortion may be avoided by an appropriate production tax/subsidy. Alternatively, the tariff
rate should be used so long as the production and consumption effects are not negative; once this point is
reached, the policy choice should be as in the text.
38. An objective of increased consumption could be appropriately reached by a consumption subsidy.
39. This conclusion will be modified in an economy having international monopoly power.
40. The Pareto optimality conditions are that the domestic marginal rate of trasformation (or relative
marginal costs of production) equals the foreign marginal rate of transformation (or world relative prices)
which equals the domestic marginal rate of substitution (or the relative value of goods to consumers).
These conditions ensure production efficiency and consumption efficiency or simply that no reallocation of
products or factors (given the orignal allocation) can be made such that one party gains and no other party
loses. The main theorem of trade is that these conditions are satisfied by free trade in perfectly competitive
markets.
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This distortion, by the foregoing analysis, can be achieved at least cost by a pro-
duction tax. Now, suppose that no target exists but that the market for this prod-
uct is characterized by monopoly. 4' Monopolists maximize profits by producing
where price exceeds marginal cost. This distortion is analytically equivalent to the
preceding one and can best be removed by a production subsidy. 42
This general conclusion has been termed the specificity rule. 43 It means that
distortions ought to be eliminated or created by intervention directed specifically
to the particular distortion. Hence, tariff imposition when there is no international
monopoly power is an inefficient device to attain a nontrade level objective (e.g., a
preference for industrialization or income redistribution within an economy).
IV
CONVENTIONAL CUSTOMS UNION THEORY
As described earlier, the essence of integration and of customs unions in partic-
ular is geographically discriminatory trade preferences. The customs union forma-
tion involves tariff elimination between members and a common external tariff
against nonmembers. The early analyses of the customs union formation were
unpublished because the results were deemed to be trivial; it seemed obvious that
the reduction in some tariff levels without changes in others was a movement to-
ward freer trade and therefore desirable. This generalization was first identified as
incorrect by Jacob Viner.44 Viner's analysis, 45 which focused only on production
and not on consumption, demonstrated that union formation may increase rather
than reduce production inefficiency by relocating production in a member nation
unable to compete on the world market without protection. Essentially, this is an
application of the second best analysis in the previous section. The different na-
tional tariffs prevent Pareto optimality; removal of some, but not all, of these dis-
tortions may or may not be welfare increasing. 46  Alternatively, given the
distortion (an import tariff), the second best optimum may not involve tariff pref-
erences granted to a subset of trading partners. 47
41. This discussion presumes that the nation has no international monopoly power.
42. A tax in the amount of monopoly profits would make the monopolist indifferent between that
output and a larger one.
The symmetry in these analyses is striking. One problem concerns the creation of a distortion while the
other concerns its removal. The former may involve movement from Pareto optimality, the latter involves
movement to Pareto optimality. The ranking of policy choices for each problem by least cost is the same
because the problems are duals. Further, it matters not whether the distortion is due to imperfect markets
(e.g., increasing returns to scale) or results from a policy directed elsewhere or is the intended result. All
fall into the same class of problems. See Bhagwati, supra note 35. Alternatively, the noneconomic con-
straint variant suggests that the eventual equilibrium is second best to free trade and provides conditions to
attain a second best optimum. The economic constraint variant suggests a second best solution which is
not a second best optimum and specifies the conditions to attain the latter.
43. C. KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS 136 (6th ed. 1978).
44. J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
45. Note that the issue of international monopoly power is again decisive for the analysis.
46. Bhagwati, supra note 35. See also, Lancaster & Lipsey, The General Theog
, 
of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11, 14 (1950).
47. Ozga has shown that it may not even involve the granting of preferences to all trading partners.
Hence, unilateral tariff reductions may not be welfare or real income enhancing. See Ozga, An Essay in the
Theogy of Tars, 63 J. POL. ECON. 489 (1955).
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The Vinerian production effect and the distinction between trade creation and
trade diversion can be illustrated simply. Assume the nation joining a union has no
international monopoly power and consumes products in fixed proportion (mean-
ing that consumption bundle composition does not change with relative price
changes). Using Figure 2, identify OA as the fixed proportion consumption curve
and BC as the constraint on consumption at world prices.48 Let this world price be
determined by the low cost producer. Then equilibrium occurs at point D. Let
the nation form a union with a higher cost producer. Then, although output of
this nation's export is unchanged, the equivalent consumption constraint will be
smaller. Let this new constraint be BE with an equilibrium at point F. Plainly,
this nation now consumes less of both goods (between points D and F) and has lost
real income. Trade has been shifted from a lower to a higher real cost source.
This shift is termed trade diversion and reduces real income.
Analogously, trade creation involves a production relocation from a higher real
cost source to a lower real cost source. This would increase real income by moving
production to a more efficient location. Using Figure 2, 49 assume that a nation has
a prohibitive import tariff in place blocking out all imports regardless of source,
and now produces at point F on BE. (It must be BE rather than BC since the
former represents a higher relative price (cost) for imports). Then, customs union
formation with any more efficient producer allows a real income gain (e.g., a shift
from point F to point D). This analysis led Viner to conclude that trade diversion
was necessarily real income or welfare reducing and that trade creation was wel-
FIGURE 2
EXPORTS
B ,DOMESTIC PRODUCTION LOCATION
A - FIXED PROPORTION
CONSUMPTION LINE
F
0 E C IMPORTS
48. Assume tariff revenues are redistributed to consumers so that the tariff affects only relative prices
and not nominal income.
49. A similar figure was initially used by Lipsey, supra note 2, at 500.
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fare increasing. As a result, Viner proposed a comparison of production conditions
in potential member nations as a guide to which effect (creation or diversion)
would likely dominate. 50
The weakness of Viner's analysis was the assumption that consumption propor-
tions were independent of relative prices. Later analysis by Meade and others in-
cluded relaxation of that assumption in order to permit consumption good
substitution. 5 1 Generally, the union formation reduces the relative price of the
tariff-ridden good and encourages its consumption, thereby increasing imports
from partner nations, reducing imports from nonunion members, and reducing
consumption of other domestically-produced products. This has important effects
on real income which may counter any trade diversion losses. Consider Figure 3
and assume that production occurs at point A and consumption at point B where
an indifference curve52 is tangential to the consumption opportunity constraint,
AC. 53 The slope of AC is the terms of trade.
FIGURE 3
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50. J. VINER, supra note 44. This will be considered below. The general result is that trade creation is
likely if production patterns of protected goods are not complementary between union members and if the
cost patterns are different.
51. See, e.g., J. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1956).
52. The indifference curve indicates alternative consumption combinations which equally satisfy con-
sumers. The further the indifference curve from the origin, the greater the associated real income.
53. This figure was first presented in Gehrels, Customs Unnsfrom a Sngle Countq Vziwpotv, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 61, 62 (1956-57).
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Then, apply an import tariff which does not affect the terms of trade. The new
equilibrium must occur on AC (which defines the real value of production on
world markets) at a point where the domestic relative price of imports is tangential
to an indifference curve. Since the tariff drives up the relative price of imports, the
new equilibrium must occur near point D. Real income has fallen due to the
tariff. Now suppose that union formation would allow trade at a relative price
consistent with the slope of AE. The new equilibrium occurs at point F which is
preferable to point D.54 This is so even though union formation entails trade di-
version (here AE represents a greater real relative cost than does AC). The com-
mon sense explanation for this result, which contradicts Viner's conclusion, is that
the production effect moves the existing level of import production to a higher cost
source while the consumption effect entails substitution of lower priced units from
the partner for higher priced units from outside the union. A more complete anal-
ysis should recognize that the consumption effect also induces a production re-
sponse in the import sector. Specifically, the consumption effect increases the level
of imports by the mechanism above and by discouraging domestic import and
import-competing production of those goods. The latter adds to the gains from
trade.55
The generalizations describing the likelihood of a nation's gain from customs
union formation are: (1) gain is more likely the more competitive the prospective
member economies are in the markets of protected goods; (2) gain will be larger
the more dissimilar the relative prices of protected products in the member econo-
mies and the more similar these relative prices in other economies; (3) given a
nation's trade volume, gain will likely be greater the higher the proportion of this
trade volume attributed to prospective union members; 56 (4) gain will likely be
larger the greater the initial tariff barrier; (5) gain will likely be larger the smaller
the common external tariff; and (6) gain will be larger when the products of pro-
spective member nations and other nations are less substitutable. 57
The explanations for these generalizations utilize arguments incorporated in
the text. Generalization (1) reflects the greater potential for trade creation which
exists when member economies display similar production lines before union for-
mation. Similarly, the first consideration in generalization (2) focuses upon condi-
tions enlarging trade creation gains while the second element focuses upon
conditions reducing trade diversion losses. Generalization (3) focuses upon condi-
54. Real income need not rise with union formation. For example, a union price ratio of AG would
produce a net loss.
55. Lipsey has incorporated this analysis in the terms intercountry substitution and intercommodity
substitution. This is important simply because it suggests the low-high cost location problem and recog-
nizes that consumers adjust purchases according to relative prices so as to maximize real income. A simple
example-the price of a good falls and it is substituted for other goods because, by doing so, consumers
maximize their satisfaction from consumption. Put differently, consumers adjust consumption to maximize
real income. Here, consumers are able to reorganize consumption because the price they face for import
goods falls with union formation. See Lipsey, supra note 2, at 504. It is useful to note that the partial
equilibrium analysis in the text showed a production loss of ADG due to the tariff (Figure 1). The in-
tercommodity substitution reflects changes in relative prices which also serve to alter production. Here, the
gain will be something less that ADG.
56. Lipsey, supra note 2, at 508. Terms of trade are not considered.
57. Some of these generalizations were first suggested by J. MEADE, supra note 51, at 107-11.
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tions which reduce the probability of trade diversion losses (e.g., there can be no
trade diversion when the customs union involves all actual and potential trading
partners). Generalizations (4) and (5) stress conditions which enlarge trade crea-
tion gains and reduce trade diversion losses, respectively. Finally, generalization
(6) identifies a condition affecting the degree of trade diversion losses.
The preceeding analysis assumed that customs union formation did not affect
the terms of trade. This assumption is valid in only a limited number of cases. 58
An important series of questions concerns the effect of union formation on the
intraunion terms of trade and the terms of trade between each union member and
the rest of the world. Unfortunately, there are no unambiguous results or simple
generalizations, but several points can be made. As discussed earlier, the balance
of trade reflects market forces operating on internationally traded goods and a
balance of these forces yields an equilibrium terms of trade. This equilibrium
terms of trade may be adjusted by customs union formation. Trade diversion due
to customs union formation reduces the volume of imports from outside the union
so that the equilibrium terms of trade (for any surviving trade) for the importing
union member vis-i-vis the rest of the world must improve. 59 Consequently, there
is an increase in that nation's real income from that trade with the rest of the
world which survives union formation. This gain counters trade diversion losses
and invites attempts to exploit the rest of the world by some union tariff policy.
60
Quite plainly, this result and the previous conclusions concerning customs union
formation may hold for each union member. This result makes clear the error in
the view that customs union formation aids the exporting union member at the
cost of the rest of the world. The costs of diversion are actually borne by consum-
ers in the importing union member (with possible mitigation by a terms of trade
improvement). The intraunion terms of trade effect is similarly considered. The
trade diverted to union members and intercommodity substitution forces the im-
porting members' trade balance into deficit. Correction requires a terms of trade
deterioration (improvement for the exporting union member).6 1 In essence, this
forces up the cost of these imports so that trade diversion is more costly when the
exporting union member's export supply schedule reflects increasing (rather than
constant) costs. However, part of this loss is an intraunion transfer to export good
producers. Overall, the impact of union formation upon the intraunion terms of
trade is difficult to predict because these effects could occur in all union members
simultaneously. 62
58. These limited cases are those of the small nations which have no international price setting capa-
bility.
59. The common sense of this is that the reduction in demand for imports faced by the rest of the
world forces a movement down the supply schedule of the rest of the world, thereby lowering the absolute
and relative price of the import good. The critical assumption is that the supply schedule considered above
is no longer horizontal.
60. It is useful to recognize that real income is the decision variable here.
61. See H. JOHNSON, MONEY, TRADE AND ECONOMIc GROWrH at 56-57 (1967). As Johnson pointed
out, a terms of trade gain is more likely to occur the more inelastic is the supply of exports schedule from
the rest of the world. Additionally, the cost of trade diversion (over the constant cost case) falls as the
exporting union member's export supply schedule becomes more elastic.
62. This issue is nevertheless broached in rough form by the question of "balance" negotiation in the
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The difficulty in making unambiguous terms of trade predictions for customs
union formation has forced attention onto other economic aspects of union forma-
tion. These are usually termed dynamic effects and include the effects of: (1) in-
creased competition among industries within the union; (2) an enlarged market
which may permit economies of scale and generate higher average rates of growth;
and (3) expanded capital inflows to the union. The increased competition argu-
ment is that tariff elimination among members eliminates a source of monopoly
power and allows exposure of formerly protected firms to other competitors. The
expected result is increased efficiency. The liability here is obvious-the inefficient
firms may be driven out of the market, leaving the possibility of the reestablish-
ment of monopoly power. A customs union enlarges the market available to any
producer located within the union. This tends to encourage further specialization
in production and thereby cost reductions. These economies of scale can result, for
example, from learning by doing or the establishment of a skilled factor pool.
Scale economies might also result from increased competition which tends to re-
duce monopoly and imperfect competition. These imperfect market structures
tend to result in differentiated products and correspondingly shorter production
runs. Increased competition tends to increase the length of production runs by
reducing the number of differentiated products. This increased intraindustry spe-
cialization may also result from the supplantation of differentiated products satis-
fying particular custom union member nation preferences by similar products
produced elsewhere in the union. 63 Average growth rate increases result when the
enlarged market effectively reduces the risks of expansion and/or innovative in-
vestment and encourages firms to take advantage of opportunities to expand their
relative and absolute shares of the market. 64 Finally, the prospect of a common
external tariff may encourage an inflow of foreign capital so that the capital own-
ers can produce and compete within the union without the tariff burden attached
to union imports. This result benefits the union. 6 5
union formation process. See P. ROBSON, CURRENT PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, at ch. 3
(1971).
63. It has been shown that Canada did not realize scale economies relative to the U.S. because the
Canadian output mix was highly differentiated. See Daly, Scale and Specialization in Canadian Manufac-
turing (Economic Council of Canada Staff Study No. 21, 1962). Grubel found that trade growth among
EEC members took the predominant form of increased intraindustry trade. See Grubel, Jntra-Industly Spe-
ctahzatzon and the Pattern of Trade, 33 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Sci. 374, 376-80 (1967).
64. See T. SCITOVSKY, ECONOMIC THEORY AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, at chs. 1, 3
(1958). The enlarged market should also induce future enlargements due to income growth. For example,
trade will continue to be needed as income grows for products which are income elastic (so that, for exam-
ple, a 5 percent increase in income leads to 10 percent increase in expenditure on that good).
65. Mordechai Kreinin has pointed out that the view that these growth implications of customs union
formation are usually presented as real income increasing to the rest of the world is incomplete. He argued
that the immediate effect of union formation is to reduce growth rates in the rest of the world by trade
diversion and terms of trade losses (or simply market reduction) and investment diversion. As a result, the
"dynamic consolation prize usually offered to non-participating nations . . . is not always valid." See
Kreinin, On the Dynamic Efcts of a Customs Union, 72 J. POL. ECON. 193, 195 (1964). Consequently, retalia-
tion to union formation has its attractions. Additionally, member nations may have objections to foreign
ownership and, therefore, seek to create disincentives for this inflow.
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V
CRITICISM AND EXTENSION OF CONVENTIONAL CUSTOMS
UNION THEORY
The major criticism of the customs union analysis presented above is that, ab-
stracting from terms of trade effects and dynamic considerations, some nonprefer-
ential tariff structure can generate the same results at lower cost. 66 The essence of
this conclusion can be seen in Figure 4 below. The domestic demand and supply
schedules for imports are given by D and S, respectively. The import supply
schedule for the prospective union is given by SHSu (reflecting the prospective
partner's ability to produce at lower cost than the domestic economy for outputs
greater than that at point H). The world import supply schedule is given by S*
and is horizontal so that no terms of trade effect can occur. Plainly, the world
supply price is less than that of the prospective partner economy. Assume that the
domestic nation imposes a nonpreferential tariff rate of t. This forces the world
supply schedule to S*t with AB/OB representing the tariff rate. The uniform ap-
plication of this rate makes trade with the rest of the world more attractive than
with the prospective partner. The effective import supply schedule becomes
SHJS*t. The equilibrium solution occurs at point K with domestic production of
import and import-competing goods in amount OE, domestic consumption in
amount OF, and imports in amount EF. These imports are taken from the lowest
real cost external source.
FIGURE 4
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Assume a customs union is formed with the result that the tariff rate t is main-
66. This argument is made in Cooper & Massell, A New Look at Customs Umon Theoy, 75 ECON. J. 742
(1965).
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tained on world supplies of the import good and eliminated on imports from the
partner economy. The effective import supply schedule becomes SHLMS*t with
equilibrium occurring at point L. Consequently, domestic production declines to
the amount OC and consumption increases to the amount OG. Accordingly, im-
ports rise to amount CG where EF reflects trade diversion (imports taken from a
higher real cost location), CE represents trade creation (production relocation to a
lower real cost location as part of intercommodity substitution) and FG represents
trade creation due to consumer substitution of imports for other products which
are now relatively more expensive. In summary, consumers gain in surplus by
AKLN, domestic producers lose an effective subsidy of AJIN, and government
loses tariff revenue in amount JKRQ. The latter loss is attributable solely to trade
diversion. On balance, the net effect on real income is JIS + KLT - STRQ. This
result may be positive or negative (the geometry shows it as a loss here). The point
of this criticism can be seen by the imposition of a nonpreferential tariff rate of
BN/OB or t* on S*. Then, the effective supply schedule becomes SHILS*t, which
yields the same production and consumption results as the union case. However,
the trade diversion loss of STRQ is avoided because tariff revenues are still col-
lected. 67 Accordingly, an appropriate nonpreferential tariff policy appears prefer-
able to the customs union because it avoids the trade diversion loss. This raises the
question why customs unions are ever preferred to a nonpreferential tariff policy. 68
Further reflection leads one to question why protection is ever adopted over free
trade when these alternatives are evaluated using the real income standard. 69
The proposed solutions to these questions have included: (1) a respecification
of the decision objective function to include political or collective objectives absent
in the traditional analysis (e.g., a collective preference for industrial development);
(2) recognition of the appropriateness of tariff strategies to exploit monop-
oly/monopsony power and to attain trade balance objectives (balance of payments
targets in a world of fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates and given terms of trade);
and (3) explicit acceptance of the hypothesis that dynamic considerations over-
whelm the static effects.
The collective objective argument is important and useful in explaining real
world events. The argument is that real income consists of private sector consump-
tion of real goods and services (as before) and collective or public consumption of
government-provided real goods and services. The objective remains to maximize
real income with the recognition that additional collective consumption requires a
reduction in private consumption. Accordingly, society may maximize real in-
come by imposing a tariff which encourages the collective consumption of indus-
67. An alternative is to recognize that this policy permits the purchase of inputs at a lower real cost.
It has been observed that tariff revenues lost in union formation must be provided in a less efficient way if
the services financed by the tariff are not to be lost. Id. at 746.
68. The optimum tariff argument is ruled out by assumption. Also, the second best arguments mean
that tariffs are inefficient in certain instances.
69. An analogous question recognized by Johnson is why tariff negotiators regard tariff reductions as
concessions requiring compensation if tariff reductions are generally beneficial (recall Ozga's contrary re-
sult). See Johnson, An Economic Theory of Protectionism, TarifBargatiing and the Formation of Customs Unions, 73
J. POL. ECON. 256 (1965).
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trial production at a cost of reduced real private consumption.70 As the previous
discussion suggests, such industrial production could be achieved at lesser cost by a
subsidy program. Nevertheless, tariff policies are generally used because: (1) the
revenue required to cover subsidy payments may be difficult to collect; (2) the
tariff policy permits the domestic industry to appear competitive; and (3) GATT
principles forbid direct export subsidization. 71
The equilibrium conditions can be developed easily. Expanded real income
will be maximized when the marginal private cost of protected industrial produc-
tion equals the marginal collective value of such production.7 2 The marginal pri-
vate cost may be divided into a consumption cost and a production cost. The
latter is the degree of tariff protection-the wedge between world and domestic
production costs. The consumption cost is the real income loss resulting from the
tariff-induced price increase. As a result, the marginal private cost of protected
industrial production schedule (hereinafter marginal private cost) lies above the
product supply curve for the output levels which are only attainable with protec-
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70. This is consistent with the development plans of many economies. This approach avoids the
traditional result that the choice of protection is not economic and therefore irrational. Instead, it suggests
that the degree of apparent irrationality is really a measure of the premium paid to attain the trade-off. See
G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
71. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an international institution designed to
encourage multilateral tariff reduction negotiations and to formulate rules to prevent undesirable protec-
tionism. These explanations and much of what follows draw upon Johnson, supra note 69. Note also that
most nations forbid foreigners to dump (sell below cost) in their markets for fear of eventual monopoliza-
tion. Such a procedure could be a result of direct subsidy.
72. This is the Pareto Optimal Solution.
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tion. Using Figure 5, the domestic supply and demand schedules for imports are
given by S and D, respectively, and the world import supply schedule is given by
S*. The marginal private cost schedule is given by ASP.7 3 The marginal collective
value schedule is given by PF. Equilibrium occurs where marginal private cost
equals the marginal collective value at point B. Therefore, the approprite tariff
rate to maximize expanded real is t*. Domestic production occurs in amount OC,
domestic consumption occurs in amount OD with imports in amount CD. The
tariff-ridden domestic price will be OE, or the world supply a price plus the tariff.
The degree of preference for industrial production is the premium paid to ob-
tain it, p. This analysis suggests that the less competitive the domestic industry,
the greater the likely degree of protection. (This means that point A in Figure 5
would be located further down the domestic supply schedule). Similarly, a deteri-
oration in competitive capability (tle., a shift to the left of supply schedule) would
call forth additonal protection to maximize expanded real income. A prohibitive
tariff precludes all imports, so that additional industrial protection can only be
attained by subsidizing the production of exports. Such a policy must be accom-
panied by additional tariffs to prevent reimportation and to prevent import substi-
tution for export consumption. However, since GATT rules forbid export
subsidization, industrial exporters have no use for a tariff strategy unless they have
monopoly/monopsony power. In this event, however, the tariff strategy is attrac-
tive to industrial importers and exporters.
Customs unions grant preferences or discriminatory reciprocal tariff reduc-
tions. The issue becomes the attractiveness of such propositions. The focal point
of an answer must be the reason for tariff imposition. Assume that reciprocal tariff
reductions are negotiated between an industrial importing nation and an indus-
trial exporting nation so that the terms of trade remain constant and payments are
balanced. Then, the industrial exporter increases both its exports and imports.
Balanced trade expansion means that each extra import unit permits an additional
export unit to which is attached a marginal collective value for industrial produc-
tion; therefore, this nation's expanded real income rises because the marginal col-
lective value of imports exceeds its private value. The industrial importer also
experiences an increase in exports and imports. However, each extra import unit
substitutes for domestic industrial output and induces a loss in collective value.
The industrial importer has no incentive to engage in reciprocal tariff reductions
unless its terms of trade improve as part of the bargain. Without monopoly power,
this improvement can come about only through the generosity of the industrial
exporter.
A more generally applicable model of the same construction assumes that all
nations are both industrial importers and exporters, so that all nations want pro-
tection and can profit from reciprocal tariff reductions. Recognizing that direct
73. The marginal private cost schedule reflects the addition of the consumption cost of the tariff to the
supply schedule. The production cost is included in the supply schedule. The common sense of the con-
sumption cost is that it is the consumer's surplus lost on the units no longer imported or the addition to real
income required to allow the original free trade level of imports.
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export subsidization is illegitimate, nations can satisy the industrial preference
through protection of domestic producers of import-competing products. Under
these conditions and absent trade monopoly/monopsony power, a reduction in a
nation's import tariff increases its imports. Imports then substitute for domesti-
cally-produced import-competing goods so that collective value is lost. The other
nation's import tariff reduction encourages export production and provides an in-
crease in collective value and expanded real income. Accordingly, reciprocal tariff
reductions are imperfectly compensatory. Expanded real income rises in each
economy because there is no marginal private cost for additional export produc-
tion while there is a marginal private cost for additional import production. Con-
sequently, a given collective value can be acquired at lower cost by export good
expansion than by changes in output of the import. This result depends on the
impermissibility of export subsidization so that the subsidy rate is zero. Since the
subsidy (or tariff) is the vertical distance between the supply schedule and the
marginal private cost schedule, a zero value makes marginal private cost zero. Al-
ternatively, the impossibility of export subsidization means that society is unwill-
ing to give up any private consumption for additional export production while it
must do so to obtain additional import production. It follows that tariff reduction
will continue until one economy has no tariff left.
GATT rules specify that the most favored nation principle must apply to tariff
negotiations unless a customs union or free trade area results. Therefore, union
formation may be attractive because any trade diversion (intercountry substitu-
tion) resulting from the preferential tariff elimination permits the partner to ex-
pand its export production at the expense of the rest of the world rather than by
reducing its own production of import substitutes. The cost to the preference
grantor is the price (cost) differential between the partner and the rest of the
world. On the trade creation side, preferential tariff elimination offers the partner
the whole of enlarged imports, only part of which represents a reduction in import
substitute production. The most favored nation principle provides the partner
with a smaller export expansion. Overall, preferential tariff elimination reduces
the cost to each partner of offering the other partner additional collective value.
As a result, customs union formation may be a lower cost technique for satisfying
the collective preference for industrialization. 74  It is important to note that this
extension of the customs union model has trade diversion as a positive welfare
factor and that this result stems from the assumptions of a preference for industri-
alization and the impossibility of direct export subsidization. Consequently, the
customs union alternative becomes more attractive as: (1) the industrial produc-
tion preference becomes stronger (implying the collective value gains are relatively
larger); (2) the nation's competitive position in industrial production becomes
weaker (so that industrial exports are relatively small); (3) the comparative advan-
tages (disadvantages) do not match between partners (representing a movement
away from the rival economy conclusion of conventional analysis); (4) the member
economies satisfy their collective preferences by import protection; and (5) the de-
74. The preference-receiving nation cannot benefit unless its export sales rise. Ergo, it must not sell
more of its export to the partner before union formation than after it.
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grees of conditions (1) and (2) between potential partners are more similar. The
latter reflects the fact that customs unions entail across-the-board tariff elimination
so that each member wants to ensure that it will not be overly penalized for its
partners' skills.
VI
SUMMARY
The main theorem of international economics is that free trade in perfectly
competitive markets ensures production and consumption efficiency in each nation
and for the world. Nevertheless, nations customarily impose tariffs to raise real
income above the free trade level, to correct market failures, to redistribute income
internally, and to facilitate industrial development. The frequent use of the tariff
policies runs against the specificity theorem which states that the tariff is a rela-
tively inefficient (in real income terms) policy for the attainment of most objec-
tives.
The customs union was initially regarded as a movement toward free trade.
Subsequent analyses have made it very clear that union formation may be either
real income increasing or decreasing. The ultimate real income effect depends
upon a balancing of the induced trade creation and trade diversion effects. These
effects depend upon a large number of factors which cannot be generalized. Con-
sequently, the magnitude of trade creation and of trade diversion cannot be pre-
dicted a priori. Therefore, static customs union theory provides no simple maxims
and thereby accentuates dynamic considerations.
Page 33: Summer 19811

